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We review the security requirements for vehicular communication networks and provide 
a critical assessment of some typical communication security solutions. We also propose 
a novel unconditionally secure vehicular communication architecture that utilizes the 
Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) key distribution scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last years, vehicular communication networks have become an emerging re-
search topic. The main motivation for the deployment of a more intelligent vehicular sys-
tem is the need to enhance transportation safety and efficiency. In this type of network, 
vehicles will be equipped with advanced sensing and computing capabilities where com-
munication protocols will enable them to share information with each other and roadside 
infrastructure. The incorporation of this new range of technology will create a smart net-
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work where every vehicle is aware of its surrounding environment. In fact, a great num-
ber of applications are under development to improve traffic safety and mobility, and 
perform financial transactions (e.g. toll collection).  These new features will, at some 
level, improve the quality of life of people and will help to alleviate environmental issues 
such as pollution and the waste of non-renewable fossil energy [1]. 
 
1.1. Vehicular communication network and nodes  
Figure 1 shows a commonly used vehicular communication architecture model [2–6]. 
 
Fig. 1. Vehicular communication network architecture. 
 
Three types of nodes are encountered in this kind of network: Vehicles, Roadside 
Devices (RSDs) and Certification Authorities (CAs).  The vehicles (private or public) and 
the RSDs are equipped with wireless devices, computing and sensing platforms, and pro-
tocol units that will enable them to transmit and receive information. They may be 
housed in the controller units at signalized intersections, mounted on sensor poles or dy-
namic message gantries or installed anywhere along the roadside. These devices act as 
intermediate nodes to vehicles that want to communicate with other vehicles (multiple 
hops) or with CAs. The certification authority represents a trusted entity in charge of stor-
ing and managing information related to the vehicles. Each certification authority is in 
charge of a specific region and manages all nodes registered with it.  
There are also three types of communications taking place in this network: Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Roadside-Device (V2RSD) or as typically called Vehicle-
to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Certification-Authority (V2CA). The V2V and 
V2RSD communications use wireless technology, typically the IEEE 802.11p [7], which 
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is an adjustment made to the IEEE 802.11 standard and it has been integrated in the 
5GHz Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) [7–8] to add Wireless Access in a 
Vehicular Environment (WAVE) [8–9]. V2V and V2RSD communications commonly 
include frequent safety-related messages (warnings) to give the drivers the necessary time 
to prevent and detect dangerous situations. The V2CA communication requires both 
wireless and wireline technology, where the RSD links to a wired network connecting the 
vehicles to the CA. V2CA communication normally includes messages requesting new 
keys and/or signatures to establish a secure communication with other vehicles or RSDs.  
Figure 2 illustrates some communications scenarios. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Communication in vehicular networks. 
 
1.2. Vehicular Communication System Security 
Even though the integration of new technology and the levels of interconnectivity make 
the vehicular communication network a more reliable and efficient system, it might also 
create new vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit. Since a vehicular network is 
widely dispersed, its communication infrastructure represents a potential target for mali-
cious users. For instance, an attacker could disseminate false information that could affect 
the decisions of other drivers.  Such attacks could lead to disastrous events such as fatal 
accidents. Also, a malicious user could monitor the position and/or trajectory of a specific 
vehicle or listen to financial transactions to steal personal and/or credit card information.  
Therefore, the safe and successful operation of a vehicular communication network re-
quires the design of very robust security architecture that ensures the protection of private 
user information without affecting the correct operation of the entire system.  
A vehicular communication system should satisfy the following security requirements 
[4, 10–11]: 
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 Authentication. The receiver must have the capability of validating the sender of 
a message and must read information only from authenticated senders. 
 Accountability and non-repudiation. Nodes cannot deny having sent a message. 
This is crucial when mapping security related events to system entities. 
 Data confidentiality and integrity.  The communication content must remain 
private and protected the entire time. Unauthorized observers should not be able 
to read, modify, delete, insert or reorder messages. 
 Availability. Even a robust network can suffer from attacks and/or incidents that 
can bring down the communication. Thus, the availability of the system must be 
supported by alternative means (e.g. network redundancy). 
In order to meet the aforementioned requirements, several security methods have 
been proposed to be implemented in the vehicular networks. Most of them rely on exist-
ing security techniques such as symmetric encryption, public key infrastructure (PKI), 
and digital signature and identity verification, among others. The PKI and the digital sig-
natures are the two most popular methods that have been suggested to be adapted into the 
vehicular networks.  In [12], the authors proposed several security mechanisms by im-
plementing combined signatures and dynamic group creation to protect user’s privacy. In 
[13], the Temporary Anonymous Certified Keys (TACKs) scheme was presented. This 
key management prevents eavesdroppers from linking keys with a vehicle and a location, 
without increasing the V2V communication overhead. The authors of [14] proposed a 
security method by constructing a short range group signature scheme with length under 
200 bytes. In [15], a different group signature-based scheme was presented, which 
achieves the most important security requirements at the same time.  In [16], a short, one-
time use long chain of keys was proposed. This scheme relies on a combination of tradi-
tional digital signatures approaches and light weight broadcast authentication process. 
The remainder of this paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. 2, we provide a critical as-
sessment of the security in vehicular communication networks. Section 3 introduces a 
novel unconditional secure key solution for vehicular communication. Section 4 presents 
some practical considerations related to the proposed solution. Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Security Considerations 
Motivated by the interesting protocols and techniques mentioned above, we discuss some 
additional concerns related to security in vehicular communication networks. 
2.1. Secure Short-distance communication 
Even though DSRC is considered a very promising wireless technology for vehicular 
systems, its effective distance (300~1000 meters [8]) could not be short enough to pre-
vent eavesdroppers from listening to vehicular messages.  The V2V and V2RSD commu-
nications should be carried out so that other nearby vehicles (parallel or crossing traffic) 
cannot overhear and/or record the transmitted information. Otherwise, sensitive infor-
mation (e.g. driver’s personal information) could be extracted, which is considered an 
anonymity/privacy violation. In fact, the recorded information could even be later used 
by malicious users to create new attack scenarios. Therefore, appropriate security tech-
niques need to be implemented in the wireless technology to be used in V2V and V2RSD 
communications. 
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2.2. Secure Positioning 
Positioning plays an important role in vehicular communication systems. Location infor-
mation is used in applications like warning messaging, traffic flow monitoring, geograph-
ical routing (Geocast), and location-based services [17–18]. In vehicular environments, 
the time and location of vehicles is usually provided by the Global Positioning System 
(GPS). This is because currently most vehicles come with a navigation system that in-
cludes a GPS receiver which can be used by the vehicular communication system with a 
little additional cost. However, GPS is not sufficient. Its precision depends on line-of-
sight communication with satellites and urban surroundings (e.g. tall buildings and tun-
nels) degrade its performance. This makes the GPS vulnerable to jamming, spoofing and 
other kind of attacks from malicious attackers [19].  
Secure positioning in vehicular communication networks represents a very challeng-
ing area that still needs further investigation. Research must account for techniques that 
allow vehicles to securely obtain their own and other vehicles’ location from the GPS 
satellites and prevent them from falsifying their position. 
2.3. Short connection time security 
It is very interesting to point out that vehicular communication networks are very dynam-
ic. The constant movement and high speeds of vehicles affect access to the wireless net-
work. The available communication time that vehicles have to exchange messages with 
each other or with RSDs is very limited. Therefore, short connection time and fast hand-
over methods need to be taken into account in order to have reliable V2V and V2RSD 
communications. Also, note that traditional security techniques (such as key manage-
ment) may not work properly. Thus, either the existing security methods must be adapted 
or new solutions must be designed to fulfill the fast and short connection time require-
ments. 
2.4. Security Overhead 
We have already pointed out that existing security methods (i.e. PKI, digital signatures) 
are considered to be the most viable mechanisms to meet the specific characteristics and 
strict security requirements of vehicular communication networks. Nonetheless, a major 
disadvantage of these techniques is that they require the broadcasting of many authentica-
tion messages that might cause high computational (processing) and/or communication 
overhead. The processing overhead results from the process of exchanging and verifying 
digital signatures and certificates, while the communication overhead is a consequence of 
the extra bits needed for the header and footer security related-fields in the messages [20–
21].  
Since the overhead increases when the number of vehicles sharing information in-
creases, in high density scenarios the security-related overhead evidently becomes note-
worthy, thus affecting the performance of the network. Therefore, it is very important to 
investigate how to reduce the overhead in the actual solutions and/or propose new tech-
niques and protocols that consider the security-related overhead in its design. 
 
 
2.5. Unconditionally secure techniques 
Another topic that is worth considering is that most of the existing security mechanisms 
for vehicular communications use a software–based key and signature generation and 
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distribution. This means that their performance is based on the assumption that eaves-
droppers trying to gain access to security-related information possess limited computa-
tional power. Strictly speaking, these techniques offer only computationally conditional 
security [22]. Therefore, if eavesdroppers can increase their computational power, the 
keys and digital signatures might be extracted. This would allow them to intercept all the 
communication between the transmitter and receiver. 
In the next section, we propose an unconditionally secure vehicular communication 
architecture where the information about the key extracted by eavesdroppers is not de-
termined by their computational power but by the laws of physics and the conditions un-
der which the protocols are operating. 
2.6. Secure V2CA communication 
CAs manage and store very important information associated to vehicles and RSDs, such 
as location information tables, node identities, and credentials. Before initiating the in-
formation exchange with another vehicle or with a RSD, a vehicle needs to obtain securi-
ty-related information (e.g. certificates) in order to be considered authentic. In this case, 
the vehicle first communicates with the RSD which then links the vehicle to the CA by 
using a wireline connection. If this wireline communication is intercepted on the way 
to/from the CA, important information could be given away. Thus, securing both the 
V2RSD and RSD2CA communication channels is necessary.  
Though there is plenty of research on securing the V2RSD communication, very little 
attention has been devoted to secure the wireline RSD2CA communication. In the next 
section, we explain in detail how we can secure the information exchange between the 
RSD and CA.  
 
3. Unconditionally Secure key for Vehicular Communication Networks 
In this section, we propose the use of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme 
to enhance the key exchange in vehicular communication systems. We focus primarily on 
securing the key distribution of both the wireline and wireless part of the vehicular com-
munication system, seeking to satisfy the security considerations we outlined earlier in 
this article. 
3.1. Unconditionally secure key exchange 
Unconditionally secure key exchange, also referred as information theoretic secure key 
exchange, is considered to be the strictest security condition for key genera-
tion/distribution schemes. This is because the security measures in these schemes are 
determined by information theory, under the assumption that a third party maliciously 
eavesdropping possesses unlimited resources (i.e. unlimited computational power) to 
extract information [22]. There are two levels of information theoretic security measures. 
It can be perfect, which means that the information extracted by the eavesdropper is zero. 
Another way of interpreting perfect security is that while the eavesdropper is limited only 
by the laws of physics, the two communication parties can approach perfect security limit 
provided they have enough resources (e.g. economy, time). Information theoretic security 
can also be imperfect if there is just a small amount of information leak towards the 
eavesdropper [23].  It is important to mention that perfectly secure distribution of a key of 
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finite length is not reachable in practice. However, the goal is to come up with schemes 
that can approach (though never reach) perfect security.  
In vehicular communication systems, where security has taken an increasingly im-
portant role, there is a need for a new key exchange scheme that can approach a perfect 
security level. The KLJN-secure key distribution scheme is an unconditionally secure key 
distribution scheme that is based on Kirchhoff’s loop law of quasi-static electrodynamics 
and the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of statistical physics [23–26]. The security of this 
scheme is a consequence of the Second law of thermodynamics and its level remains the 
same even when the eavesdropper’s computational power, measurement speed and accu-
racy are considered to be (hypothetically) infinite. An abstract view of the unconditional-
ly secure KLJN key exchange scheme is shown in Fig. 3 [27 –28].  
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the core Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system. 
 
The idealized KLJN scheme can be seen as a wire line connecting two communi-
cating parties, denoted “Alice” and “Bob”. At the beginning of each bit exchange period, 
Alice and Bob—who have identical pairs of resistors  0 1,R R , with 1 0R R  and 0R   
representing the low (0) bit and 1R
 
the high (1) bit, respectively—randomly select and 
connect one of these resistors ( AR  and BR , respectively) and their thermal-noise-like 
voltage generators ( ( )Au t  and ( )Bu t , respectively)  to wire line.   Thus, there are four 
possible ways in which the resistors can be connected to the wire. Alice and Bob can 
connect the same resistance values to the wires—i.e., the 00- and 11-bit situations. These 
cases are considered a non-secure bit exchange because an eavesdropper would be able to 
overhear the communication.  The cases when Alice and Bob connect different resistance 
values—i.e., the 01- and 10-bit situations— represent a secure bit exchange because, as a 
consequence of the Second Law of Thermodynamics [23–26], an eavesdropper is unable 
to locate the resistors. Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the inverse of 
his/her bit, which implies that a secure key exchange takes place. 
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3.2. Network model with unconditionally secure key exchange 
Before comprehending the unconditionally secure key exchange protocol for vehicular 
communication systems, we should first describe our proposed network model. The main 
goal of this new model is to generate and distribute information theoretically secure keys 
that are later used to secure information prior to transmission.  An abstract view of this 
vehicular communication architecture, with nodes and authorities, is shown in Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Vehicular communication network model with unconditional secure key exchange. 
 
As noticed, very few changes have been made to the existing vehicular communication 
architecture. The network nodes remain the same except for a new node: the roadside key 
provider (RSKP). The RSKP can be visualized as a gate, and it is in charge of providing 
the cars with unconditionally secure keys. The communication channel used in this key 
distribution can be supported by a close proximity communication technology such as 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) [29–31], Near Field Communication (NFC) 31, 
and/or Near Field magnetic induction communication (see Fig. 5)[32].  Near field mag-
netic induction communication utilizes an inductive coupling. The operating frequency 
range is centered on 13.56 MHz on ISO/IEC 18000-3 air interface and offers data trans-
mission rates ranging from 106 kbit/s to 424 kbit/s within a distance of approximately 10 
centimeters or less [33].  
 Since close proximity communication technologies utilize a wireless communication 
interface, eavesdropping is an important issue [34].  An unauthorized third party could 
use an antenna to listen the transmitted signals. In order to provide protection against 
eavesdropping and data modification attacks, a secure channel can be established [34-35]. 
The authors of [34] proposed a NFC specific key agreement. This key agreement does 
not require any asymmetric cryptography thus reducing the computational requirements 
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significantly. In [35], a key agreement protocol between a reader and a tag that is re-
sistant in presence of passive adversaries in RFID communication was proposed. 
Another change in the network topology is that the RSD2CA communication now 
utilizes an extra wire for KLJN key exchange. The existing wire line between the RSD 
and the CA can be kept for high speed communication purposes. Also, an extra wire line 
between the RSKP and the CA has been included to transmit safety and mobility-related 
messages.   
Table 1 shows a summary of the type of communications between the different nodes 
in the proposed vehicular communication network with unconditional secure key ex-
change. It also shows the communication technology utilized and the points at which the 
KLJN system will be used. 
 
Table 1. Communications in the vehicular network model with unconditional secure key exchange 
Type of Communication Communication Technology KLJN system 
V2V Wireless Communication No 
V2RSD and/or RSD2V Wireless Communication No 
 
V2CA and/or CA2V 
 
Wireless Communication (V2RSD or RSD2V) 
and Wireline Communication (RSD2CA or 
CA2RSD) 
Yes (wireline 
segment) 
CA2RSKP and/or RSKP2CA Wireline Communication Yes 
RSKP2V Close Proximity Communication No 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Abstract illustration of roadside key providers delivering an unconditionally secure key to the vehicle via 
Near Field magnetic communication. Similar to the transformer principle, the magnetic near-field of two con-
ductor coils is used to couple the initiator device (located at the RSKP) and listening device (located at the 
vehicle) [33]. Modulation schemes used include: amplitude on/off keying (OOK) with different modulation 
depth (100 % or 10 %) and Binary phase-shift keying (BPSK)[33]. 
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Under this secure key distribution solution, each node (i.e. vehicle and RSDs) will be 
assigned a key that does not contain any information related to the identity of a vehicle so 
user’s privacy is preserved. This key will unconditionally secure the information that one 
node sends to another across the vehicular network. For instance, before a vehicle sends a 
message, it first signs it with its unconditionally secure key. The receiver of the message 
has to extract and verify the key of the sender. The protocol used for message authentica-
tion and key verification is out of the scope of this paper and will be considered in future 
works.  
 
 
4. Practical considerations and Future work  
4.1. KLJN key exchange protocol 
The development of the key exchange protocol to be used in our proposed unconditional 
secure vehicular communication model is one of the most important subjects to take into 
consideration in the future. This protocol should comprise a detailed explanation on how 
keys are generated, distributed and stored. It must also consider the keys’ lifetime (dura-
tion) and their replacement. Furthermore, the protocol should provide authentication 
techniques that produce the least possible computational and communication overhead.  
4.2. Key Length 
The key length is a very important security parameter since it determines the highest se-
curity that can be provided. This is because the security of a communication system can-
not be better than the security of the key exchange it utilizes. Therefore, a methodology 
to choose an appropriate KLJN key size to secure vehicular networks is recommended. 
4.3. Transmission rate 
It is understandable that the transmission rate of distributing the KLJN key is less in 
comparison to software-based key exchange methods. This is because in this scheme, the 
duration of the bit exchange period   should be long enough to achieve reasonably good 
noise statistics and securely distinguish between the different resistor situations [24]. 
Thus,
 
f
B
<< B
KLJN
 where 1/Bf   is the effective bandwidth and KLJNB  is the channel 
noise bandwidth [24, 27–28]. This physical limit determines the tradeoff between the 
length of KLJN wire, the number of cars served by a single KLJN connection and how 
well the practical unconditional security will approach the perfect security level. Besides, 
even though simple and inexpensive ways to improve the speed and security of this key 
scheme have been proposed [24], a cautious cost-benefit analysis should be carried out to 
evaluate the cost of additional chip technology and a multi-wire cable.  
4.4. Technology  
The KLJN key exchange method requires dedicated cables, resistors, close proximity 
communication technology, statistical tools for bit decision and many other additional 
technology. Practical implementations of this scheme [25] have shown that this key ex-
change method is not only low-priced but also extremely robust and almost maintenance-
free. However, the amount of KLJN units needed for key distribution will depend on the 
required key transmission rate and the key length.   
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this Letter, we assessed some concerns regarding the security in vehicular communica-
tion networks. Based on this assessment, we outlined how the KLJN system could theo-
retically be used to achieve unconditionally secure keys to secure vehicular communica-
tion networks. The main advantage of this information-theoretic secure key network 
model is that no computational limitations are placed on the eavesdropper. This means 
that, with sufficient information about the channel quality and the messages, it is possible 
to make very accurate statements about the information that is extracted by the eaves-
dropper.  
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